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Abstract—This paper quantifies the impact of correlated fading
on secure communication of multiple amplify-and-forward (AF)
relaying networks. In such a network, the base station (BS) is
equipped with multiple antennas and communicates with the
destination through multiple AF relays, while the message from
the relays can be overheard by an eavesdropper. We focus
on the practical communication scenario, where the main and
eavesdropper’s channels are correlated. In order to enhance
the transmission security, transmit antenna selection (TAS) is
performed at the BS, and the best relay is chosen according to the
full or partial relay selection criterion, which relies on the dual-
hop relay channels or the second-hop relay channels, respectively.
For these criteria, we study the impact of correlated fading
on the network secrecy performance, by deriving an analytical
approximation for the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and an
asymptotic expression for the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio
(MER). From these results, it is concluded that the channel
correlation is always beneficial to the secrecy performance of full
relay selection. However, it deteriorates the secrecy performance
if partial relay selection is used, when the number of antennas
at the BS is less than the number of relays.
Index Terms—Secure communication, correlated fading, relay
selection, secrecy diversity order.
I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by the rapidly increasing demand on data transmis-
sion over the open wireless medium, in the last few years
the privacy and security in wireless networks have attracted
widespread attention from both academia and industry [1].
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Besides the traditional encryption schemes, physical-layer
security (PLS) has been proposed to achieve the information-
theoretical security. PLS can be traced back to the pioneering
Shannon’s work [2], who proposed that a perfect secrecy
can be achieved in wireless communication systems. Several
years later, Wyner proposed a classical wiretap model to
analyze the secure communication [3], which was extended
to study the PLS over fading channels. Furthermore, in [4],
[5], secure communication over Rayleigh fading channels
was investigated, and analytical expressions for the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) and secrecy capacity were provided.
In [6]–[8], the impact of more complicated fading channels
on the secrecy performance, was investigated. Finally, some
fundamental works on the physical lay security in interference
alignment networks were initially done by Zhao Nan [9],
which focused on the anti-jamming, anti-eavesdropping, and
collusive eavesdropping issues for interference alignment.
Antenna selection [10]–[12] has been proposed as an easy-
to-implement strategy to enhance security of multi-antenna
wireless communication systems, by exploiting the channel
fluctuation among multiple antennas. In [13], transmit antenna
selection (TAS) was used at the base station (BS) to improve
the secrecy performance by increasing the number of antennas.
In [14], TAS was implemented for MIMO wiretap channel, and
the secrecy performance was studied by deriving analytical
expressions for the secrecy capacity and SOP. Apart from
antenna selection, secure relaying is another effective strategy
to enhance wireless security, since it exploits the channel
fluctuation among multiple relays. There are two fundamental
relaying protocols, namely, amplify-and-forward (AF) and
decode-and-forward (DF) [15]–[17]. In [18], [19], relay se-
lection was performed to secure multiple AF relay networks,
where several relay selection criteria were proposed and exam-
ined. In [20]–[23], relay selection was used to secure multiple
DF relay networks, and an analytical expression for the SOP
and asymptotic results in the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio
(MER)1, were derived. We note that although the security
analysis has been well studied for the DF relay network
[20]–[22], [24], [25], it is rarely studied for the AF relay
network. This is because the received signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) expressions at the destination and the eavesdropper in
the AF relay network are much more complicated than those
in the DF relay network, which increases the complexity of
the analysis. Hence, a thorough and accurate analysis for the
secrecy performance is of significant importance for the AF
1In practice, the high MER is encountered when the eavesdropper is located
far from the relay or the received antenna gain at the eavesdropper is small.
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relay network.
A major limitation of the aforementioned studies lies in
the assumption that the eavesdropper’s channel is independent
from the main channel. However, this assumption may not
hold in practical communication scenarios, due to the existence
of several factors, such as radio scattering environments and
antenna deployments [26]–[28]. In such scenarios, the main
and eavesdropper’s channels are correlated, which affects the
system secrecy performance. Motivated by this, the authors
in [29] studied the impact of correlated fading on the secrecy
performance in the high SNR regime. Furthermore, in [30], the
performance of secure communication over correlated fading
channels was studied, and expressions for both the secrecy
capacity and SOP were provided in the form of infinite series.
Hence, to the best of our knowledge, the effect of correlated
fading has been concentrated on the secure non-cooperative
communications, and its impact on the secure cooperative
relay networks has not yet been investigated.
In this paper, we analytically investigate the impact of
correlated fading on secure multiple AF relaying networks,
which are composed of one BS equipped with M antennas,
N AF relays, one receiver, and one eavesdropper. The BS
transmits its signal to the receiver through N relays, which
can be overheard by an eavesdropper. We consider the practical
communication scenario, where the main and eavesdropper’s
channels are correlated. In order to enhance the network
security, TAS is adopted at the BS and full or partial relay
selection is used to choose the best relay. The novelty of our
work can be summarized as follows:
 We analytically evaluate the impact of correlated fading
channels on a multiple AF relaying network, where two
relay selection criteria are considered, namely, full relay
selection and partial relay selection. For both criteria,
we derive a novel analytical approximation for the SOP,
in order to evaluate the impact of correlated fading on
the secrecy performance in the whole SNR and MER
regimes.
 We derive an asymptotic expression for the SOP in the
high MER regime, to determine the factors, that govern
the network secrecy performance. Based on the asymp-
totic SOP expressions, we find that the secrecy diversity
order of the full and partial relay selection criteria is equal
to N and min(M;N), respectively. Moreover, we show
that the channel correlation is beneficial for the full relay
selection criterion, but detrimental to the partial relay
selection criterion when M < N .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model with correlated fading and then
the two relay selection criteria. Section III derives the ana-
lytical approximation for the SOP, along with the asymptotic
expressions in the high MER region. Numerical and simulation
results are provided and discussed in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes this work.
Notations: We use CN (0; 2) to represent a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable (RV) with zero
mean and variance 2. We use fX() and FX() to represent
the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative density
function (CDF) of the RVX , respectively. The function, I0(x),
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Fig. 1. Secure multiple AF relays with multi-antenna at the BS.
is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of order
zero [31], while Pr[] denotes probability, and E[] denotes
statistical average.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 depicts a secure multiple AF relay network over
correlated fading channels. In this network, the BS is equipped
with M antennas fTXmj1  m  Mg, and there are N
intermediate AF relays fRnj1  n  Ng, to assist the
secure transmission from the BS to the destination D. One
eavesdropper2, E, exists in the network, and overhears the
messages from the relays. In this work, we consider the
communication scenario where the direct channel between
the BS and eavesdropper suffers severer shadowing, due to
an obstacle or the eavesdropper is located far from the BS.
If the eavesdropper can overhear the message from the BS,
the network secrecy performance becomes worse, since the
direct links can be used by the eavesdropper for secrecy data
detection. We consider the practical communication scenario,
where the channels from the relays to D and E are correlated,
due to e.g. radio scattering and antenna deployments. In order
to enhance the security, the best relay, Rn , is selected among
N relays, and the BS employs TAS3 to choose the best
antenna, TXm , in order to transmit the information.
We assume that the m-th antenna, TXm, and the n-th relay,
Rn, are used for secure data transmission. In the following,
we present the two-phase transmission process and the relay
selection criterion. In the first phase, TXm sends the normal-
ized signal, xs, with power P to Rn. The received signal at
Rn is given by
yRn =
p
Phm;Rnxs + nR; (1)
2In this paper, the eavesdropper is equipped with a single antenna due to
size limitation. However, if there are multiple antennas at the eavesdropper,
the network secrecy performance becomes worse, since the eavesdropper can
exploit the multi-antenna diversity at itself. But in this case, the network
secrecy diversity order will remain unchanged with the increased number of
antennas at the eavesdropper [18].
3Although TAS technique presents slightly worse performance than beam-
forming, it needs much less implementation complexity and RF chain cost.
Therefore, TAS is adopted in this paper, and it can be applied for the
scenarios where the system has a complexity constraint, e.g., the hardware
cost. Moreover, the channels from the BS to relays are not correlated with
the channels from relays to receivers, since the channel correlation is only
considered at the receivers. Hence, using all antennas at the BS will not
change the analytical framework of performance evaluation in this paper.
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where hm;Rn  CN (0; ) denotes the channel coefficient of
the TXm–Rn link and nR  CN (0; 2) is the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the relay. Then Rn amplifies the
received signal, yRn , by the factor, , given by
 =
s
P
P jhm;Rn j2 + 2
; (2)
and then forwards the resultant signal to D. The received
signals at D and E are given by
yD = hRn;DyRn + nD; (3)
and
yE = hRn;EyRn + nE ; (4)
respectively, where hRn;D  CN (0; ) and hRn;E 
CN (0; ") represent the channel coefficients of the Rn–D
and Rn–E links, respectively, and nD  CN (0; 2) and
nE  CN (0; 2) are the AWGN at the D and E, respectively.
We assume that due to factors such as radio scattering and
antenna deployments, the channels hRn;D and hRn;E are
correlated, characterized by the joint PDF [30]
fjhRn;Dj2;jhRn;E j2(x; y) =
I0

2
1 
q
xy
"

(1  )" e
 
x

+
y
"
1  ; (5)
where,  = cov(jhRn;Dj
2;jhRn;E j2)p
var(jhRn;Dj2)var(jhRn;E j2)
2 [0; 1], is the power
correlation coefficient. In particular,  = 0, denotes the
independent channel scenario, while  = 1 indicates that
hRn;D and hRn;E are completely correlated. Since the channel
correlation coefficient  is a long-term statistical variable, we
can estimate it by some samples of hRn;D and hRn;E during
non-secure data transmission, where both D and E are served
by the BS. Then the estimated  can be used for the secure
data transmission, where E acts as the eavesdropper.
From (1)–(4), we obtain the received end-to-end SNRs at
D and E as
SNRDmn =
~P 2umnvn
~Pumn + ~Pvn + 1
; (6)
and
SNREmn =
~P 2umnwn
~Pumn + ~Pwn + 1
; (7)
respectively, where ~P = P=2 is the transmit SNR, and
umn = jhm;Rn j2, vn = jhRn;Dj2 and wn = jhRn;E j2 are
the associated instantaneous channel gains.
The secrecy outage probability (SOP) is defined as the
probability that the data rate difference between the main and
eavesdropper’s channels falls below a certain threshold, Rs,
Pmn;out = Pr
h1
2
log2(1 + SNR
D
mn)
  1
2
log2(1 + SNR
E
mn) < Rs
i
(8)
= Pr
h1 + SNRDmn
1 + SNREmn
< s
i
; (9)
where s = 22Rs is the secrecy SNR threshold. Since it is
difficult to obtain an accurate analytical expression for the
SOP of the network, we use [19, eq. (16)] to give a lower
bound on the SOP as
Pmn;out > Pr
h
min
  umn
s   1 ;
vn + 1= ~P
s

<
1
~P
+ wn
i
; (10)
> Pr
h
min
  s
s   1umn; vn

<  + swn
i
; (11)
where  = s 1~P , and we apply min
 
umn
s 1 ;
vn+1= ~P
s

<
min
 
umn
s 1 ;
vn
s

+ 1~Ps
from (10) to (11). Note that the lower
bound in (11) is effective to evaluate the SOP, especially when
the transmit power is large.
In this work, we consider the practical secure commu-
nication scenario, where the eavesdropper is not willing to
feedback its channel parameters, and hence, only the main
channel parameters can be used for the relay selection. From
(11), a full relay selection criterion based on the main links is
given by
(n;m) = arg max
1nN
max
1mM
min
  s
s   1umn; vn

; (12)
where the TAS is jointly performed at the BS. Note that
the selection in (12) requires the availability of the channel
parameters of the dual-hop relaying, which adds a load in
the practical implementation, especially for a large number
of antennas at the BS. In order to reduce the implementation
complexity, a simpler partial relay selection is considered as
n = arg max
1nN
vn; (13)
and the antenna is selected at the BS as
m = arg max
1mM
umn : (14)
Note that this criterion is a separate relay and antenna selec-
tion, and it only needs the availability of the parameters of the
second-hop relaying channels.
From the above description, we provide the following
remark: Different from the secure non-cooperative commu-
nications, the secure cooperative communications may require
the first-hop relaying links to be used for the relay selection
criterion. Moreover, the first-hop relaying links interact with
the second-hop main and eavesdropper’s links in the perfor-
mance analysis, making the derivation much more compli-
cated. Furthermore, the impact of the system parameters such
as the channel correlation coefficient on the network secrecy
performance is also affected by the first-hop relaying links.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we derive an analytical approximation for
the SOP for the full and partial relay selection criteria, and
provide the asymptotic expressions with high MER. Note that
in the security analysis with independent fading, the eaves-
dropper’s channel parameters can be easily separated from the
main channel parameters. This simplifies the derivation of the
security analysis. Differently, in the security analysis with cor-
related fading, it is very difficult to separate the eavesdropper’s
channel parameters from the main channel parameters, and
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these parameters need to be jointly computed to derive the
security. This makes the derivation much more complicated
and challenging. Moreover, the impact of channel correlation
coefficient on the network secrecy performance may depend on
many factors, such as the specific relay selection criterion and
the network parameters including the number of the relays and
antennas. Hence, it is another challenge to explicitly examine
the impact of channel correlation coefficient on the secrecy
performance. To fulfill this task, we derive the asymptotic SOP
expression in the high MER regime, to determine the factors
that govern the network secrecy performance.
A. Analytical approximation for the SOP in full relay selection
According to the full relay selection criterion in (12),
the lower bound on the SOP achieved, when the full relay
selection criterion is used, can be written as
PLBout;Full = Pr
h
min
  s
s   1um
n ; vn

<  + swn
i
(15)
=
NX
n=1
Pr

min(~un; vn) <  + swn;
min(~un; vn) > max
k=1; ;N;k 6=n
min(~uk; vk)

; (16)
where ~un is defined as
~un = max
1mM
s
s   1umn: (17)
Due to the symmetry among the N relays,
PLBout;Full = N Pr

min(~u1; v1) <  + sw1;
min(~u1; v1) > Z1

(18)
= N Pr

min(~u1; v1) > Z1
 N
 Pr min(~u1; v1)   + sw1;min(~u1; v1) > Z1;
(19)
where Z1 is given by
Z1 = max
k=2; ;N
min(~uk; vk): (20)
Note that the first term in (19) is equivalent to the prob-
ability of random choose the maximal among N indepen-
dent and identically distributed RVs. As such, we have
Pr

min(~u1; v1) > Z1

= 1N . Then PLBout;Full can be rewritten
as
PLBout;Full = 1 N Pr

min(~u1; v1)   + sw1;
min(~u1; v1) > Z1

= 1 N Pr min(~u1; v1) > Z1; Z1 >  + sw1
 N Pr min(~u1; v1)   + sw1; Z1 <  + sw1
= 1 N
Z 1
0
Z 1
+sw
Z 1
z
Z 1
z
f~u1(~u)fv1;w1(v; w)
 fZ1(z)dzd~udvdw  N
Z 1
0
Z +sw
0
Z 1
+sw
Z 1
+sw
f~u1(~u)fv1;w1(v; w)fZ1(z)dzd~udvdw: (21)
In order to solve the integral in (21), we need to provide
the PDFs of fv1;w1(v; w), f~u1(~u) and fZ1(z). The PDF of
fv1;w1(v1; w1) can be represented in the form of infinite series
as [30]
fv1;w1(v; w) =
1X
q=0
b0qv
qwqe b1ve b2w; (22)
with
b0q =
q
(1  )2q+1(")q+1(q!)2 ; (23)
b1 =
1
(1  ) ; b2 =
1
(1  )" : (24)
In [30], it was proved that this series converges, since the error
after the truncation is exponentially bounded. Next, we use the
first T terms in (22), where T is selected in order to ensure
that the truncation error is lower than a very small certain
value e(T ).
From (17), we now provide the CDF and PDF of ~u1 as [32]
F~u1(~u) = (1  e 
~u
~ )M ; (25)
and
f~u1(~u) =
d
d~u
F~u1(~u) =
MX
m=1

M
m

( 1)m 1m
~
e 
m~u
~ ; (26)
respectively, where ~ = ss 1. From (20), the CDF of Z1 is
written as
FZ1(z) =

Pr[min(~u1; v1) < z]
N 1
=

1  F~u1(z)Fv1(z)
N 1
=

1  e  z (1  (1  e  z~ )M )N 1: (27)
By using the binomial expansion, we write the PDF of Z1 as
fZ1(z) =
d
dz
FZ1(z) =
]X
fig
c1ic2ie
 c2iz; (28)
with
]X
fig
=
N 1X
i1=0
i1X
i2=0
  
iM 1X
iM=0
; (29)
c1i =( 1)i1++iM

N   1
i1

i1
i2

  

iM 1
iM
 
M
1
!i1 i2

 
M
2
!i2 i3
  
 
M
M   1
!iM 1 iM
; (30)
and
c2i =
i1 +   + iM
~
+
i1

: (31)
Since the Fubini-Tonelli theorem holds, we can exchange
the summation and integration, by applying the PDFs of
fv1;w1(v; w), f~u1(~u) and fZ1(z) into (21), and thus, to solve
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the resultant integral. Finally, we obtain the analytical approx-
imation for the secrecy outage probability for the full relay
selection criterion as
Pout;Full  1 
MX
m=1
TX
q=0
qX
k=0
kX
j1=0
j1X
j2=0
]X
fig
1;mqkj1j2iLq+j2(b2
+ b3s)e
 b3  
MX
m=1
TX
q=0
qX
k=0
kX
j=0
]X
fig
2;mqkji
 Lq+j(b2 + b3s)e b3; (32)
with Ln(x) = n!x (n+1),
1;mqkj1j2i = N

M
m

j1
j2

q!
j1!
( 1)m 1 b0qc1ic2i
j1 j2j2s
bq k+11 b
k j1+1
3
;
(33)
b3 = b1 + c2i +
m
~
; (34)
and
2;mqkji = N

M
m

k
j

q!
k!
( 1)m 1 b0qc1i
k jjs
bq k+11
: (35)
Note that the derived analytical approximation in (32) consists
of elementary functions only. Hence it is easily to be evaluated.
B. Analytical approximation for the SOP in partial relay
selection
According to the partial relay selection criterion in (13), we
write the lower bound on the secrecy outage probability as
PLBout;Partial = Pr
h
min
  s
s   1um
n ; vn

<  + swn
i
=
NX
n=1
Pr
h
min
 
~un; vn

<  + swn;
vn > max
k=1; ;N;k 6=n
vk
i
: (36)
Due to symmetry among N relays, we further write PLBout;Partial
as
PLBout;Partial = N Pr
h
min
 
~u1; v1

<  + sw1; v1 > Z2
i
= N Pr[v1 > Z2] N Pr
h
min
 
~u1; v1
 
 + sw1; v1 > Z2
i
; (37)
where
Z2 =
X
k=2; ;N
vk; (38)
and its PDF is given by [32]
fZ2(z) =
N 1X
n=0

N   1
n

( 1)n 1n

e 
nz
 : (39)
Since Pr[v1 > Z2] = 1N , we can compute PLBout;Partial as
PLBout;Partial = 1 N Pr
h
min
 
~u1; v1
   + sw1; v1 > Z2i
= 1 N
Z 1
0
Z 1
+sw
Z 1
+sw
Z z
0
f~u1(~u)
 fv1;w1(v; w)fZ2(z)dzdvdwd~u: (40)
By following the same way as above and by applying the
PDFs of f~u1(~u) in (26), fv1;w1(v; w) in (22) and fZ2(z) in
(39) into (40), and solving the resultant integral, we obtain the
analytical approximation for the secrecy outage probability for
the partial relay selection criterion as
Pout;Partial  1 
MX
m=1
N 1X
n=0
TX
q=0
qX
k=0
kX
j=0
3;mnqkjLq+j(b2
+ b4s)e
 b4; (41)
with
3;mnqkj = N

M
m

N   1
n

k
j

( 1)m 1 q!
k!
b0q
k jjs
(b1 +
n
 )
q k+1 ;
(42)
and
b4 = b1 +
m
~
+
n

: (43)
Note that the analytical approximation for the secrecy outage
probability in (41) is tight and composed of elementary
functions only. As such, it is easy to use to evaluate the secrecy
outage probability for the partial relay selection criterion.
C. Asymptotic SOP for full relay selection
To obtain useful insights into the network performance
achieved by the full relay selection criterion, we now present
the asymptotic SOP from the lower bound. When the transmit
power P is large, we approximate the SOP of the full relay
selection from (15) as
Pout;Full ' Pr[min(~un ; vn) < swn ]: (44)
For the full relay selection criterion in (12), the asymptotic
CDFs of ~un and vn are given by [18]
F~un (x) '
8>>><>>>:
 
1 +
~

N 1 x
~
N
; If M = 1
MN
M +N   1
xM+N 1
~MN 1
; If M  2
; (45)
Fvn (x) '
8>><>>:
 
1 +
~

N 1 ~

 x
~
N
; If M = 1
 x

N
; If M  2
: (46)
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From these two equations, we can rewrite the asymptotic
Pout;Full as
Pout;Full ' 1  Pr[min(~un ; vn)  swn ]
= 1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[1  F~un (swn)][1  Fvn (swn)]dwnvn
'
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Fvn (swn) + F~un (swn)dwnvn
= Pr(vn < swn) + Pr(~un < swn): (47)
We first calculate Pr(vn < swn) with M  2. Similar to
[28], we use  to denote vn=wn and derive its PDF as
f() =
Z 1
0
wfvn ;wn (w;w)dw (48)
=
NX
n=1

N
n

n( 1)n 1
"(1  )
n
 + (

 +
1
" )
1
1 h
n
 + (

 +
1
" )
1
1 
2
  4(1 )2"
i3=2 ;
(49)
where [31, eq.(6.623.2)] is used in the last equality. Let  = " ,
and for the high MER, we approximate f() as
f() =
NX
n=1

N
n

( 1)n 1(1  )
[+ n(1  ) + ]2 : (50)
From (50), we compute Pr(vn < swn) as
Pr(vn < swn) =
Z s
0
f()d (51)
' N !
 (1  )s

N
; (52)
where we apply the approximation of (1 + x) 1 'PN
k=0( 1)kxk [31]. Since the asymptotic CDFs of ~un and
vn have the same form of power function, we can compute
Pr(vn < swn) with M = 1 and Pr(~un < swn), in
a similar way. By summarizing these results, we obtain the
asymptotic SOP achieved by the full relay selection with high
MER as
Pout;Full '
8>><>>:
Ns N !
N
 
1 +

~
N 1
~
+ (1  )N

; If M = 1
Ns N !
N
(1  )N ; If M  2
:
(53)
From the asymptotic result in (53), we can obtain useful
insights into the network secrecy performance, as follows:
Remark 1: The secrecy diversity order is N , indicating that
the secrecy performance achieved by the full relay selection
criterion can be rapidly improved by increasing the number of
relays.
Remark 2: The asymptotic SOP decreases when  increases,
indicating that the channel correlation between the main and
eavesdropper’s links enhances the secure transmission facili-
tated by the full relay selection criterion. This is because that
when the channel correlation coefficient increases, the channel
fluctuation of the second-hop main link becomes more similar
to that of the eavesdropper’s link, which helps prevent the
wiretap in the high MER regime. Hence, the network secrecy
performance can be improved with larger  for the full relay
selection.
Remark 3: For multiple antennas at the BS withM  2, the
first hop does not affect the secure transmission, and only the
second hop affects the secrecy performance. Hence, increasing
the number of antennas at the BS does not profoundly improve
the secrecy performance, achieved by the full relay selection
criterion.
D. Asymptotic SOP for partial relay selection
In this subsection, we derive an asymptotic expression for
the SOP, when the partial relay selection criterion is used, in
order to provide some useful insights in the network perfor-
mance. Assuming large transmit power P , the SOP achieved
by the partial relay selection criterion can be approximated as
Pout;Partial ' Pr[min(~un ; vn) < swn ] (54)
' Pr(~un < swn) + Pr(vn < swn): (55)
Note that from the partial relay selection criterion in (13), we
can obtain the asymptotic CDF of vn as
Fvn (x) '
 x

N
: (56)
Hence, according to (52), we compute Pr(vn < swn) as
Pr(vn < swn) ' N !
 (1  )s

N
: (57)
Now we turn to calculate Pr(~un < swn) as
Pr(~un < swn) = N Pr(~u1 < w1; v1 > Z2)
= N
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FZ2(v1)F~u1(w1)
 fv1;w1(v1; w1)dv1dw1
' NM !MN
 
(s   1)
M
M
; (58)
where [31, eq. (6.614.3)] and the series approximation of (1+
x) 1 ' PMk=0( 1)kxk are applied in the last equality, and
MN is given by
MN =
N 1X
n=0

N   1
n

( 1)n (1 + n(1  ))
M
(1 + n)M+1
: (59)
Summarizing the results in (57) and (59), we obtain the asymp-
totic SOP achieved by the partial relay selection criterion as
Pout;Partial ' NM !MN
 
(s   1)
M
M
+N !
(s(1  ))N
N
;
(60)
From (60), we conclude the following insights into the network
performance:
Remark 1: The secrecy diversity order is min(M;N). In
particular, when M < N , the first hop becomes the bottleneck
of the secrecy performance of the network. On the contrary,
when M > N , the second hop limits the secrecy performance
of the network.
Remark 2: The impact of the channel correlation between
main and eavesdropper’s links on the secrecy performance
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depends on the relationship between M and N . Specifically,
when M > N , the second term of the asymptotic Pout;Partial
dominates, and hence the channel correlation is beneficial to
the secrecy performance of the network. On the contrary,
when M < N , the first term of the asymptotic Pout;Partial
dominates. Since MN increases slightly with larger , the
channel correlation is detrimental to the secrecy performance
of the network achieved by the partial relay selection criterion
when M < N . This is because that when the channel
correlation coefficient increases, the channel fluctuation of the
second-hop main link becomes more similar to that of the
eavesdropper’s link, which helps prevent the wiretap in the
high MER regime. Hence the network secrecy performance
can be improved with larger  for the partial relay selection
with M > N . However, for the partial relay selection with
M < N , we can find from Remark 1 that the first relay hop
becomes the bottleneck of the network security, and increasing
 helps strengthen the eavesdropper’s link, which conversely
deteriorates the network security. Accordingly, it would be
recommended to increase  for the partial relay selection
criterion when M > N , but decrease  when M < N .
From the above analysis, we can find that the full relay
selection criterion is better than the partial relay selection
criterion in the secrecy performance, but it needs more imple-
mentation complexity. Hence, the work in this paper provides
a flexible choice for the practical system design: the full relay
selection is preferred to obtain a better secrecy performance;
while the partial relay selection is adopted to reduce the
complexity.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulations and numerical exam-
ples to validate the derived analytical results. All links in the
network undergo Rayleigh fading, and the path-loss channel
model is adopted, with the loss factor equal to 4. Without loss
of generality, the distance between the BS and receiver D is
normalized to unity. Let d denote the distance between the BS
and relays, so that  = d 4 and  = (1  d) 4. The secrecy
date rate Rs is set to 0:5 bps/Hz, so that s = 2. To accurately
compute the analytical approximations in (32) and (41), we set
the exponentially bounded truncation error to a small value of
10 10, leading to that T = round
   10
log10 

. Accordingly, only
the first T terms are kept in the analytical approximations.
Figs. 2 and 3 demonstrate the secrecy outage probability
achieved by the full and partial relay selection criteria versus
the transmit SNR ~P , where d = 0:5,  = 20 dB, M = 3 and
N varies from 1 to 3. Specifically, Figs. 2 and 3 correspond
to the full and partial relay selection, respectively. To show
how close the analytical approximation approaches to the
exact value, we also present the simulated results of (15)
and (36) for the full and partial relay selection, respectively.
Several cases of channel correlation are investigated, with
 = 0:3; 0:5, and 0:7. As observed from these figures, the
analytical approximation is close to the simulations, while
the asymptotic curve converges to the exact one, when the
transmit SNR is high. In particular, the proposed analytical
approximation matches well with the simulated results of (15)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus the transmit SNR ~P : Full relay
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus the transmit SNR ~P : Partial relay
selection
and (36) for the full and partial relay selection, respectively.
This validates the derived analytical approximation for the
secrecy outage probability and the asymptotic expression for
both criteria. Moreover, the SOP improves when  increases
for different values of N , indicating that the channel corre-
lation is beneficial to the secure transmission. Furthermore,
the SOP becomes smaller when N increases, as more relays
strengthen the secure transmission.
Figs. 4 and 5 illustrates the effect of the number of relays
on the secrecy outage probability achieved by both selection
criteria versus MER, where d = 0:5, P = 40 dB, M = 3
and N varies from 1 to 3. We also consider  = 0:3,
0:5, and 0:7. Figs. 4 and 5 depict the full and partial relay
selection, respectively. It is evident from these figures that for
different values of N and , the analytical approximation is
an effective approximated result, especially with high MER,
and the asymptotic result converges to the simulation one in
the high MER regime. This shows the accuracy of the derived
analytical approximation and the asymptotic results. Moreover,
we find that the secrecy outage probability curves are in
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Fig. 4. Effect of relay number on the secrecy outage probability versus MER:
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Fig. 5. Effect of relay number on the secrecy outage probability versus MER:
Partial relay selection
parallel with the number of relays, indicating that the secrecy
diversity order of both selection criteria is equal to N when
M  N . Furthermore, the secrecy outage probability achieved
by both criteria improves with larger channel correlation or
more relays, since the secure transmission can be enhanced
by a larger  and a larger N .
Figs. 6 and 7 show the effect of number of BS antennas on
the secrecy outage probability achieved by both relay selection
criteria versus MER, where d = 0:5, P = 40 dB, N = 3 and
M varies from 1 to 3. Again, we consider  = 0:3, 0:5, and
0:7. Figs. 6 and 7 address the full and partial relay selection,
respectively. As observed from Fig. 6, the secrecy outage
probability curves are in parallel with each other for different
values of M , indicating that the secrecy diversity order of
the full relay selection criterion depends on the number of
relays only. In contrast, the secrecy outage probability curves
in Fig. 7 are in parallel with M , and hence the secrecy outage
probability achieved by the partial relay selection criterion
is determined by the number of BS antennas. Moreover, the
secrecy outage probability achieved by the full relay selection
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Fig. 6. Effect of antenna number on the secrecy outage probability versus
MER: Full relay selection
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Fig. 7. Effect of antenna number on the secrecy outage probability versus
MER: Partial relay selection
criterion improves with larger , as the channel correlation
is beneficial to the secrecy performance. On the contrary,
the secrecy outage probability achieved by the partial relay
selection criterion becomes worse with larger  whenM < N ,
indicating that the channel correlation becomes detrimental
to the secrecy performance when the partial relay selection
criterion is adopted.
Figs. 8 and 9 depict the impact of channel correlation
coefficient  on the secrecy outage probability achieved by
both relay selection criteria, where d = 0:5, P = 40 dB,
 = 20dB, M = 2 and N varies 1 to 4. The channel
correlation coefficient varies from 0 to 0:9. Figs. 8 and 9
concentrate on the full and partial relay selection, respectively.
As observed from these two figures, we find that for the full re-
lay selection criterion, the secrecy performance improves with
larger channel correlation. In contrast, for the partial relay se-
lection criterion, the secrecy outage probability improves with
larger  if M  N ; otherwise deteriorates. This phenomenon
validates the insights gained from the asymptotic expression
for the partial relay selection criterion in (60). Moreover, the
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probability: Partial relay selection
analytical approximation for the SOP and the asymptotic result
match well with the simulation result for different values of N
and , which further verifies the effectiveness of the derived
results for both relay selection criteria.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the impact of correlated fading
channels on the performance of secure AF relaying, where
the M -antenna BS adopts TAS to transmit its signal to the
destination with the best relay out of N relays. The eavesdrop-
per overhears the message from the relays, and the main and
eavesdropper’s channels were assumed correlated. Apart from
TAS at the BS, we addressed both the full and partial relay
selection criteria for secrecy enhancement. For both criteria,
we analyzed the network secrecy performance by deriving
the analytical approximation for the SOP and its asymptotic
expression with high MER. From the asymptotic expression,
we conclude that the channel correlation is beneficial to the
secrecy performance achieved by the full relay selection crite-
rion, but it degrades the secrecy performance achieved by the
partial relay selection criterion when M < N . Furthermore,
the secrecy diversity order of the full and partial relay selection
criteria is equal to N and min(M;N), respectively. In the
future work, we will investigate the communication scenario
where the eavesdropper can also overhear the message from
the BS. Since the direct eavesdropping links may be correlated
with the main links, the performance evaluation will become
much more complicated, and a new analytical framework
needs to be developed.
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